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FRANCISCO SALTO ALEMANY
IN CONTINUITY: A REFLECTION ON THE
PASSIVE SYNTHESIS OF SAMENESS
It is an intimate experience for us to think, to understand and to
perceive things as being identical'to themselves, and to suppose, con-
sequently, that things are truly "what" they are. Something is always
conceived as itself. The given is given full of itself in all its modifica-
tions. For instance, I can think or perceive partially some lips, I can see
them almost in their whole or in some of their aspects, or just see them
disappear. But it does not seem to be possible to think or to perceive a
given as almost itself, as an aspect or as part of itself. It is the aim of
this work to study the assumptions and conditions for the original
position of sameness in experience, just as it occurs in the synthesis of
the datum singular and distinct. The polarization of single tone (ein-
stimmig) intentional rays in an avr6 already contains the aporiae
peculiar to the experience of the identical, whose revelation shall lead
us, on the one hand, to one of the nuclei of the analysis of passive
synthesis, and, on the other hand, to point up how critical revision of
the numerical or extensional model of self-identity is for the unity of
meaning. Then, it will be a question of pointing out the reasons why in
a phenomenology of identity, the renunciation of the phenomenological
legitimacy of the avr6 as a guarantee for the different positions of
identity must be observed. To have a meaning does not necessarily
mean to have "one" meaning (or any quantity of them).
I. ASSUMPTIONS
The sameness of an immanent datum becomes a phenomenological
problem relevant to the analysis of the experience of the identical when
the following assumptions, at least, are considered:
1) The synthetic processes of identification and covering (Deckung) by
which the sameness of an object in general becomes a phenomenon,
require the prior givenness of immanent data, distinct and singular,
whose unity is concrete in the living present. Therefore, in the phe-
nomenological analysis of the object's identity, we are inexorably
referred to the aspectival and modal identity of their givenness.
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2) The immanent unity of identity that appears in a singular datum
cannot be conceived in the manner of a phenomenal atom of meaning
whose synthetic groupings might constitute the object's identity. A
singular is not, phenomenologically, an atom of self-identity. Its own
sameness is constituted itself synthetically and passively from con-
stituent mUltiplicities which remain implicit. (Husserliana [henceforth,
Hua.] XI, 120-1) The givenness of the immanent unity of the identical
appearance becomes the passive synthesis "of the homogeneity in
continuity" (Ibid., 141), which requires as its pre-given conditions: a)
continuity in the form of order in temporal (and eventually spatial)
points and b) the pre-affective processes of "concreteness and discrete-
ness" (concretion and contrast).
3) From the previous assumptions, it follows that a distinction can be
reasonably inferred, one between linking syntheses (Verbindung syn 
thesen) in which singular data are associated, (already assumed in their
differentiation and self-identity, in superior objective unities of same-
ness) and continuing synthesis, in which immanent singular data are not
supposed, but the givenness of singular sameness is constituted
throughout them in a continuity. (Cfr. Hua. X, 240-1 and 258f.) The
constituent multiplicities in the "absolute" present do not consist of
multiple unities (Hua. XI, 387): they are not themselves, although they
are "implicitly present in the background of the 'something.'"
II. FORMAL CONTINUITY AND INDIVIDUATION
a) The Complexity of the Singular
It is easy to understand the reasons that lead Husser! to establish the
synthetic structure of the experience of identity and, consequently, to
place the formal condition of the unity of the immanent datum in the
synthesis of time-consciousness.
The fact that a datum is given being the same as itself means that its
identity has a constancy (it is constant in the continuous course of its
modifications). A formal condition for the concrete and present experi-
ence of the identical is that this should "succeed." And something
succeeds, or endures as something - as an avr6 - and independently
of its content, if it consists of the continuous succession of itself, that is
to say: in the differential constancy of the same through constantly
different moments. The basic formal peculiarity of the singular given-
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ness of the identical is precisely its complexity: to each singular and
different datum there does not correspond the event of a singular
moment of the history of mental life, but the complex multiplicity of its
"different" moments. The same only succeeds in the succession of its
differences. And yet such different moments are not different for being
different from the rest of themselves (or self-identical), but rather
because they express the originariness of the phenomenon of succession
with regard to the succeeding identity. (Hua. XI, 126f.) The given in
identity and difference is, formally, the original phenomenon of succes-
sion as a differential constancy of the same. Therefore, the appearance
of a distinct singular datum, such as this precise red I perceive now,
does not refer us to a singular event that is numerically one in subjec-
tive life, but it implicitly contains the pre-giveness of preidentical
constituent multiplicities. This datum, now the red of these lips here, if
it be a phenomenal singular, then possesses a certain differential
volume: it becomes its complex extension in a continuum (at least in the
continuum of its temporal modifications). Therefore, the formal condi-
tion for the identity to become a phenomenon is its complexity or
extension in a continuity. And this way, the dependence of the
phenomenal singularity of implicit complexes explains that the experi-
ence of the identical should be described through synthesis.
b) Synthesis Through Continuity
Continuity is defined, in opposition to what continues, by its non-
continuation. Continuity itself does not have an identity, for it does not
have modifications. It does not succeed.
Let us take, for instance, the continuity of constituent life, a central
assumption in Husserl's phenomenology of identity. This experience
has no vestibule; it is not framed, and one cannot attain a perspective
with regard to the same material experimental life, which places it in
any identifiable place. Every continuity lacks differential volume, and
therefore, the identity of a datum. Once the sameness of immanent
datum is described as the differential constancy of the same, the
continuity is defined, in consequences, as a monotonous constancy. The
internal homogeneity of the continuous, its irreversibility and lack of
density, are assumptions without which, for Husserl, the appearance of
a self-identical plenum able to go through a continuity would be
unexplainable.
198 FRANCISCO SALTO ALE MANY
The continuation that goes through the continuity is, nevertheless,
phenomenologically analyzable and is not a final quality. (Hua. XI, 140)
If we now call time the form particular to the continuous of the systems
of places of immanent data (Ibid., 417), it will result in the synthesis of
the temporal form of singular data being set up as the main and most
universal synthesis that necessarily gives unity to all the objects (imma-
nent) just as they become progressively conscious and distinct in
passivity. (Ibid., 127) The synthesis of time-consciousness defines "the
original state of the identity." (Ibid., 128)
The momentary structure of the synthesis we discuss is well known.
"In each moment of life, some temporal objectivities are constituted for
us, each of which has a momentary now together with the protentional
momentary horizon." (Ibid., 126) This momentary structure of succes-
sion has a synthetic unity, in which the datum identical to itself is
constituted. We know that such a synthesis does not consist of the
linking of many different singulars in a new singular identity, but it is
the original phenomenal position of the immanent datum. "To synthe-
size" means here not "to gather" but "to con-verge" the same through
the continuity of its differences.
Jede Einheit ist Einheit im vorigen Sinne beziiglich der zeitlichen Kontiniutiit jedes
Stiickes. Aber es sind verschiedene Einheiten, die sich aber zur Einheit eines Ganzen
nicht zusammenscWillen, sondern, indem sie auf Einheit kontinuierlicher Erscheinug
und eines kontinuierlichen EinheitsbewuBtseins beruhen, stellt sich die identische
Einheit der Unterschiedenen wieder her. ... (Hua. X, 240)
The synthesis of confluence in a continuity presents some formal
pecularities which differentiate it from the idealistic notion of synthesis.
This one can be translated in its formal behavior as the operator of a
function which assigns to each different element of the synthesized
multiplicity the same identical value: that of being a member of the new
synthesized complex. "Synthesis," in this usual sense, is the result of a
unifying operation on a cumulative multitude of different elements. Let
us now take the immanent datum red just as it appears to us as "itself."
We know that the givenness of its sameness requires the constancy of
the same red through the temporal continuity of its modifications and
differences:
we can disregard any segment of the temporal extension of
the datum red without its ceasing to be itself in the succes-
sion of the remaining segments.
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we can, in abstract, recognize the same datum red in each
and everyone of the segments of the continuity.
Therefore, the datum red is in itself and wholly so in any segment,
wherever cut out, of the continuity. The original synthesis of sameness
does not require the accumulation of diversities: it cannot be defined as
the result of a process in time. For "the same" to become a phenome-
non, it has to extend differentially on a continuity, the datum itself
already contains and partakes of its whole. Husser! defines the singular
as the whole previously given to its part (Hua. XXIV, 106-7), but the
analysis of passive synthesis seems to have shown that the singular
datum is one in a way rather different from the way in which "I" is one.
All things considered, it can be concluded that the unity of meaning is
not numerical but intentional, that is to say, able to reproduce its
sameness in its parts: able to be immanent in its differences.
c) Individuation and Qualification
Time functions successfully as individuating form if and only if it
defines a continuum of unique points. Once a continuity has been
described as a monotonous constancy, it seems as though we could
assign to each sequence a unique point, and, in this way, "individuate"
each identical polarization of single tone intentional rays. However, it
will be shown here that the homomorphic correlation between the
unicity and the identity of givenness is not phenomenologically legiti-
mate.
Husserl considers that
Die Einzigkeit der Zeitstelle ist also nichts anderes als das Korrelat der Form der
jeweils vollzogenen Identifizierung in ihrem einzigen Zusammenhang, dem des kon-
stituierenden Lebens, in dem sich dieser Gegenstand als als dieser konstituiert und nur
identifizierbar ist dadurch, daB eben das BewuBtsein auf sein urspriingliches Kon-
stituieren zuriickgehen, es wieder aufwecken und als dieses selbe, als diesen jederzeit
wiedererkennbaren Gegenstand finden kann. (Hua. XI, 144)
This correlation between the individuum and its identity has, however,
many difficulties. Let us first of all review the canonic version of the
individuation of the identical. "Jeder (Gegenstand) ist er selbst und
einziger als Gegenstand sienes Zeitstellensystems, das dem universalem,
dem der einzigen Zeit zugehort." (Ibid., 143) Each identity is differen-
tially extended through a continuity of unique and unrepeatable tem-
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poral points which individuate it. Or simply, the identical lasts: it is only
self-identical as the duration of "the same."
We try now to attend to the beginning of this duration. A beginning-
point is only given as the beginning of what has begun: that is to say, as
the (begun) sameness found at its beginning. The temporal point at
which the duration of the identical begun begins is not, certainly, the
point on the beginning itself. The latter remains necessarily implicit
when one grasps the beginning of what has begun. The reason is that
perceiving the beginning of the begun sameness requires in itself the
passive synthesis of differential constancy; therefore, the beginning is
"located" at a point prior to the beginning of what has begun. (We are
forced to call this point "prior" if we are to conceive of continuity as the
homogeneous irreversibility of its sequences).
One can carry out a similar analysis on each phase of duration,
because each of them is a limit to the individuated unity. This shows the
impossibility of assigning self-identity to the point itself. A system of
points does not have individual limits: it is unable to individuate exact
identities, extensionally or numerically. In consequence we seem
brought to an understanding of the self-dentity of the singular datum as
being intensional. One should explain jointly: a) the fact that distinct
phenomena do appear, and b) the fact that the distinct (self-identical)
datum lacks individual limits.
Husser! had already found difficulties in making compatible the
experience of the identity and the synthesis of individuation.
(Jede Strecke eines Kontinuum) ist aber kein individuelJes Moment, und sie ist kein Zu-
vervielfaltigendes, kein Zu-spezifizierendes. Sie ist nicht individuell. In ihr ist, und ist
notwendig, die Individualitat. Sie macht nicht Individualitat so, als ob die absolute
einzelne Zeitstrecke in abstracto (was allerdings voraussetzt eine Individualitat, die sie
fullt, und von der abstrahiert wird) durch die Annahme, sie sei durch ein einzelnes der
Spezies Farbe erfiillt, dieses Spezies individuierte.... (Hua. X, 250)
Continuity as a formal condition for the experience of "the same"
makes impossible the individual determination of the identical, that is, it
makes impossible the distinction of limits or phases in the duration of
the identical.
We conclude that the concrete immanent unity always supposed
(even in the abstract consideration of the point-system) can not be
finitely itself: that is to say, it does not occupy a determinate contour in
logical space. The individuum is the identical sameness through the
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continuity of its modifications; and this implies that its identity is not
individual but "specific." (Hua. X, 252) The individuum is identical, is a
"what," insofar it "possesses" an essence or is qualified. The identity of
the individual has the form of a "species" because of its differential
constancy. The identity is only a quality, and "there are not, of course,
any qualitative individua." (Hua. X, 252) The abstract or exact concep-
tion of the system of individuating points in a continuity reduces
infinitely the "absolute" individuum until it becomes the "residual point
of the concrete." (Ibid., 257) The typical, concrete or inexact identifica-
tion is the only one phenomenologically legitimate, and must recognize
a margin of "Unselbigkeit."
III. INTERNAL CONTINUITY AND CONCRETION
Phenomena appear as distinct: different from all else and internally
undistinct (or self-identical). We normally call "concrete" such singular
data constituted as themselves. But the peculiar phenomenological
notion of concreteness refers - on the contrary - to its etymological
meaning as the result of a process of progressive confluence or, in
Husserl's words, "concretion." (Hua. XI, 138) Concretion in this strict
sense means the construction of the "constituted" concrete. It points up
the pregiven conditions for the appearance of a sameness, because
concretion and discreteness are "Urphiinomenen" necessarily involved
in the preconscious synthesis of identities.
Together with succession as a formal condition, the preaffective
processes of concretion and contrast explain the synthesis of the
immanent datum appearing as "itself." This synthesis through con-
tinuous time is only a formal condition for being able to identify
phenomena; synthesis through the internal continuity of content must
complement it. (Ibid., 139) The datum full of itself - a "plenum" able
to satisfy intentions - is synthetically built on the internal continuity of
its pre-identical phases (let us say, on its "cretions" and "trasts"
becoming concretions or contrasts). Once more, synthesis through
continuity can only be comprehensible in terms of intentions: their not
being finitely "themselves."
Hyletic affective unity is passively synthesized as a unity out of
implicit multiplicities, which are not properly distinct, but the distinc-
tion of the singular datum itself depends on them.
202 FRANCISCO SALTO ALEMANY
Nur eine radikale theone, we\che in gleicher Weise dem konkreten Aufbau der
lebendigen Gegenwart und dem Aufbau der einzlnen Konkretionen selbst aus konstitu-
tiven elementen Geniige tun, kann das Riitsel des "UnbewuBten" und des wechselnden
"BewuBtwerdens" lasen. (Hua. XI, 165) ... Kontretion ist nur maglich als Verschmel-
zung in der Ordnungsform, also von zeitlich Geordnetem. Wir wissen schon, und die
niihere Analyse zeigt es sofort, daB diese Ordnung alles Diskreten in sich selbst eine
kontinuierliche ist, die in ihrer Stetigkeit durch alles als Einheit fur sich Abgehobene
hindurchgeht. ... jedes abgehobene Datum steht nicht nur iiuBerlich zu anderen in
lebendigen Beziehungen der Sukzession. Vielmehr es hat in sich selbst einen synthe-
tischen Aufbau, und zwar ist es in sich selbst eine Kontinuitiit der Foige. Diese innere
Kontinuitiit ist das Fundament einer kontinuierlichen inhaltlicher Verschmelzung....
(Ibid., 140)
One should conclude that the concrete unit present in life, as a unit and
as a concretion, refers us to non-numerical "units" whose sameness is
not describable in terms of a finite avr6.
University ofSalamanca
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